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Two types of rule
The compositionality idea is the idea that semantic interpretation proceeds in two steps.
Simple expressions are interpreted by means of lexical rules, which assign meanings to them directly. Complex expressions are interpreted by means of compositional rules, which assign meanings to them indirectly, as a function of the meanings of their parts.
For any simple expression , the associated lexical rule says that the interpretation of  is a certain entity m :
(1)
I() = m
There will be as many rules of this sort as there are simple expressions (or, rather, readings of simple expressions 1 ) in the language. Since the number of simple expressions and the number of readings which an ambiguous expression has are both finite, it is, in principle, possible for a finite mind to get to know the meanings of all simple expressions of the language by learning each of the lexical rules that are associated with them in this way.
The syntax of natural language is such that (because of recursivity) the number of complex expressions is not finite : for any expression of whatever complexity it is always possible to construct a more complex expression. So it would not be possible for a finite mind to get to know the meaning of all expressions of the language, simple or complex, by learning that meaning directly. If we only had rules like (1) to interpret a linguistic expression, there would have to be an infinite number of them, and we could not learn them. So we need a different type of rule than (1) for interpreting complex expressions.
Just as the number of simple expressions is finite, the number of ways in which distinct expressions can be put together so as to yield a complex expression of the language is finite. In other words, there is a finite number of syntactic rules, through which an infinite number of complex expressions can be generated. The solution, then, is to pair each syntactic rule with a semantic rule of a new sort -a compositional rule. A compositional rule is something like A compositional rule associates with a particular way of combining two expressions  and  a function whose arguments are the meanings (interpretations) of  and , and whose value is the resulting meaning (interpretation) for the complex expression Thanks to rules of this sort, it is possible to compute the meaning of an expression of whatever degree of
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3 complexity on the basis of the meanings of its parts. If the parts are simple, their meanings I() and I() will be given directly by lexical rules such as (1). If the parts are themselves complex, their meanings will themselves be derivable via compositional rules such as (2).
In this framework, interestingly, the meaning of a complex expression only depends upon two things : the meanings of its immediate constituents (the simpler expressions into which it can be analysed), and the way they are put together. Nothing else counts. In particular, the meaning of an expression does not depend upon the meanings of other expressions that are not its constituents, even if they occur in the same sentence or discourse.
Nor can the meaning of a given expression depend upon the meaning of a more complex expression in which it occurs as a constituent. Or at least, this is standardly considered to be a consequence of compositionality. In a compositional language, we are told, the meaning of an expression depends upon the meanings of its parts, in a bottom-up fashion, but it does not depend upon the meaning of the whole to which it belongs, nor upon the meanings of the other parts of that same whole. 'Top-down' or 'lateral' influences on meaning are ruled out by the compositional procedure. Yet, according to some authors, such influences are precisely what we observe.
Semantic flexibility
A language exhibits semantic flexibility if the following condition is satisfied : in that language, the meaning of a word may vary from occurrence to occurrence, and it may vary, in particular, as a function of the other words it combines with. Through semantic flexibility, the meaning of an expression may well depend upon the meaning of the complex in which it occurs (top down influence), and it may also depend upon the meaning of the other words that occur in the same complex (lateral influence). (where 'drop' means 'drop paying'), and so on indefinitely. If we accept that a sentence can be as long as we please, then there seems no predictable end to the variety of expressions that we can put meaningfully after 'drop', so as to impose a series of different meanings on the latter word. (Cohen 1986 : 227-8) According to Cohen, the verb 'drop' takes on a different meaning in each of (3) to (6), and one of the things that determine the meaning it takes on is the noun phrase it combines with.
A similar type of example is provided by John Searle :
The sort of thing that constitutes cutting the grass is quite different from, e.g., the sort of thing that constitutes cutting a cake. One way to see this is to imagine what constitutes obeying the order to cut something. If someone tells me to cut the grass ijn_00222049, version 2 -31 Oct 2009 5 and I rush out and stab it with a knife, or if I am ordered to cut the cake and I run over it with a lawnmower, in each case I will have failed to obey the order. (Searle 1980 : 222-223) According to Searle, 'cut' means something different -has different satisfaction conditions -in 'cut the grass' and in 'cut the cake' ; and that is because the meaning which the verb 'cut' takes on on a particular occurrence depends, inter alia, upon what is said to be cut.
Similarly, the verb 'like' takes on a different meaning in (7) and (8) The examples I have given so far all involve a transitive verb the (exact) meaning of which depends upon the noun phrase that serves as its complement. An even more productive class of examples involves adjectives the (exact) meaning of which depends upon the noun they modify. A good car is not good in exactly the same sense in which a good house is ; a piece of luggage is not light in exactly the same sense in which a sound is light ; a big mouse's way of being big differs, to some extent, from the way in which a big elephant is big ; a pink grapefruit is not pink in the same way -under the same aspect -as a pink raincoat ; a fast typist's way of being fast is not the same as a fast runner's way of being fast ;
and so on and so forth. In all cases the basic meaning of the adjective is fleshed out differently according to the noun it modifies. So, if we take natural languages to be compositional, for the reasons adduced above, it seems that we must re-analyse the alleged examples of semantic flexibility, so as to make them compatible with the compositionality thesis. I will pursue that line below. But we may also, following Cohen, give up the standard, 'insulationist' approach to semantic composition assumed by Fodor in favour of an alternative, 'interactionist' approach :
According to the insulationist account the meaning of any one word that occurs in a particular sentence is insulated against interference from the meaning of any other word in the same sentence. On this view the composition of a sentence resembles the construction of a wall from bricks of different shapes. The result depends on the properties of the parts and the pattern of their combination. But just as each brick has exactly the same shape in every wall or part of a wall to which it is moved, so too each standard sense of a word or phrase is exactly the same in every sentence or part of a sentence in which it occurs…
Interactionism makes the contradictory assertion : in some sentences in some languages the meaning of a word in a sentence may be determined in part by the
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word's verbal context in that sentence… On this view the composition of a sentence is more like the construction of a wall from sand-bags of different kinds. Though the size, structure, texture and contents of a sand-bag restrict the range of shapes it can take on, the actual shape it adopts in a particular situation depends to a greater or lesser extent on the shapes adopted by other sand-bags in the wall, and the same sandbag might take on a somehwat different shape in another all or in a different position in the same wall. (Cohen 1986 : 223) According to Cohen (1986 : 230) , « we cannot construct a semantics for any natural language along the same lines as a semantics for a formal system of any currently familiar kind.
Projects like Davidson's or Montague's cannot succeed. » They cannot succeed precisely because « artificial languages satisfy an insulationist account whereas natural languages require an interactionist one » (Cohen 1986 : 224 determined, in part, by the complex expressions in which they occur. Or so I will argue. If this is true, then a language can exhibit both compositionality and semantic flexibility.
Standing meaning vs occasion meaning
In all the examples of semantic flexibility I have given, it is possible and desirable to draw a distinction between the standing meaning of the expression (verb or adjective) as fixed by the semantic conventions of the language, and the occasion meaning which the expression assumes on a particular occurrence. Thus 'cut' has a standing meaning in English, and that standing meaning is carried by all non-idiomatic occurrences of the word ; yet we need not deny that 'cut' takes on a different occasion meaning in 'cut the grass' and in 'cut the cake'.
Likewise for all the other examples : in all cases we can draw a distinction between standing meaning and occasion meaning. Note that the distinction does not apply to truly ambiguous expressions : in the case of e.g. 'bank', there is no standing meaning which the word-type itself carries, whether it is taken in the financial or in the other sense. Rather, there are two distinct word-types, each with its own (standing) meaning. Following a suggestion which Searle traces to Ed Keenan 3 , let us assume that the standing meaning of 'cut' is a function from objects of cutting (the sorts of things one cuts :
cakes, grass, etc.) to specific cutting operations relevant to those objects : mowing, slicing, etc. Let us assume, further, that the argument of the function is determined by the grammatical object of 'cut', and that the value of the function (the specific cutting operation at stake) is the occasion meaning of the verb in the verb phrase. Since the value of the function depends both upon the function and its argument, it is no surprise that the occasion meaning of 'cut' depends, in part, upon the object that is said to be cut. On this analysis the meaning of the complex 'cut the grass' depends upon the (standing) meanings of its parts in a strictly bottom up manner. The phrase 'cut the grass' represents a certain process (mowing) operating on a certain object (the grass). The semantic contribution of the verb 'cut' is not directly the process of mowing but something more abstract, namely a function which takes that process as value for a given argument (the grass). The complement 'the grass' contributes both the argument to the function and the object the mowing process operates on. So what I called the occasion meaning of 'cut' is not really the meaning of the word 'cut', on this analysis : it is an aspect of the meaning of the complex phrase, contributed jointly by the verb 'cut' and its complement. The lateral/top down dependence of the occasion meaning of 'cut' on the meaning of 'the grass' is nothing but a side effect of the compositional, bottom up dependence of the meaning of the complex 'cut the grass' upon the (standing) meanings of its parts.
One way of fleshing out the suggested analysis would be to assign the following standing meaning to 'cut' :
The occasion meaning is what we get when the grammatical object of 'cut' provides a value for the higher order variable 'X'. If the object of cutting is said to be grass, we get :
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Thus 'cut' means CUT IN THE MANNER OF GRASS when its object is a y such that GRASS (y), and it means CUT IN THE MANNER OF CAKES when its object is a y such that CAKE (y). If I order someone to cut the grass, I order him to cut the grass in a specific manner, namely, in the manner one cuts grass (by mowing it). The order will not be satisfied if, as Searle imagines, my addressee rushes out and stabs the lawn with a knife.
The same sort of analysis applies to the other examples. Consider 'big mouse' : a big mouse is not big in the same sense in which a big elephant is ; for an elephant just as big as a big mouse would not count as a big elephant. The occasion meaning of 'big' clearly depends upon the noun it modifies. But this can be accounted for by assuming that the constant meaning of 'big' is a function the value of which is the occasion meaning of 'big'. That constant meaning can be represented as an open predicate, BIG FOR AN X, where the free higher order variable stands for the argument of the function ; the occasion meaning will be the predicate we get when the free variable is assigned a particular value, which value will be determined by the noun which the adjective modifies.
Standing meaning of 'big'
On this analysis the occasion meaning of 'big' (e.g. BIG FOR A MOUSE in 'big mouse', or BIG FOR AN ELEPHANT in 'big elephant') is nothing but an aspect of the (standing) meaning of the complex noun-phrase 'big mouse' or 'big elephant' :
Standing meaning of 'big mouse'
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That explains why, like the standing meaning of the complex noun-phrase, the occasional meaning of the adjective depends, in part, upon the meaning of the noun it modifies.
Counter-examples
As usual, the devil is in the details, and a lot of details would have to be provided to make the suggested analysis worthy of serious consideration (especially when it comes to the verbobject construction Searle also provides counter-examples to the analysis :
It is easy to imagine circumstances in which 'cut' in 'cut the grass' would have the same interpretation it has in 'cut the cake', even though none of the semantic contents of the words has changed. Suppose you and I run a sod farm where we sell strips of grass turf to people who want a lawn in a hurry... Suppose I say to you, "Cut half an acre of grass for this customer"; I might mean not that you should mow it, but that you should slice it into strips as you could cut a cake or a loaf of bread. (Searle 1980 : 224- 
Context-dependence
To deal with indexicals and other context-sensitive expressions, we need to revise, or rather enrich, the framework set up at the beginning of this paper. In some cases the content of an expression cannot be assigned directly by means of a lexical rule such as (1), repeated below :
(1) 
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If, as I suggested at the end of §4, semantic flexibility is a matter of contextdependence, the distinction between standing meaning and occasion meaning turns out to be a particular case of the Kaplanian distinction between character and content. On this approach, we can still treat the standing meaning of an expression such as 'big' or 'cut' as functional, as it was in the previous account, but the argument of the function no longer corresponds to the linguistic expression with which the expression at issue combines ; rather, the function takes the context (or some aspect of the context) as argument. In the case of 'small' or 'big', the argument to the function is a comparison class provided by the context. The standing meaning of 'big' can still be represented as BIG FOR AN X, but now 'X' will be assigned a value in context much as a demonstrative or a free pronoun is assigned a value in context.
Let us call this new approach the contextual theory. How different is it from the previous approach ? Both draw a distinction between standing meaning and occasion meaning, but they treat the occasion meaning differently :
• The first theory says that the occasion meaning is not (really) the meaning of the expression at issue, but rather an aspect of the meaning of the complex phrase in which that expression occurs. Thus the predicate BIG FOR A MOUSE is not contributed by the word 'big' in 'big mouse' but by the complex phrase 'big mouse' itself. In 'big mouse', 'big' contributes BIG FOR AN X and 'mouse' contributes both the value of 'X' and the predicate MOUSE, in such a way that the complex phrase contributes the conjunctive predicate MOUSE & BIG FOR A MOUSE.
(I assume that adjectival modification is interpreted by means of predicate conjunction.) The predicate BIG FOR A MOUSE here is an aspect or part of the meaning of the complex phrase 'big mouse', determined by the meanings of its various constituents, including the expression with which the adjective 'big' combines in the phrase.
• The contextual theory sees the occasion meaning as the context-dependent content of the expression, determined by (i) the standing meaning (character) of the expression and (ii) the In this theory the content of the complex phrase is a function of the contents of its parts, in a strictly bottom-up manner ; but the content of the parts is, or may be, contextdependent, and the linguistic context in which an expression occurs is an aspect of the context which may influence its content. Lateral and top-down influences are therefore possiblethe content carried by a particular expression may depend upon the other expressions with which it combines -but this is compatible with the fact that the content of the whole depends upon the contents of its parts in a strictly bottom-up manner : indeed, on the picture I have sketched, the content of the whole depends upon the contents of its parts (and their mode of combination) and nothing else.

Saturation and modulation
Though it is on the right track, the contextual theory as stated above suffers from a serious limitation. It unduly restricts the phenomenon of semantic flexibility to a small range of expressions that are indexical-like in the sense that their linguistic meaning is 'gappy' and stands in need of contextual completion. Indexicals need to be contextually assigned a value, and so do under-specified expressions such as 'burglar nightmare' : the intended relation R needs to be contextually specified. In all such cases the standing meaning of the expression may be represented as involving a free variable to which a value must be contextually assigned, and the expression carries a definite content only with respect to such a contextual assignment. It is plausible that adjectives like 'small' fall into that category and involve covert Consider, as an analogy, the Rumelhart example I discuss in Literal Meaning (Recanati 2004 : 73, 105-6 ) :
(9) The policeman stopped the car
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We naturally interpret this as meaning that the policeman stopped the car by addressing an appropriate signal to the driver, just as we naturally interpret 'John cut the cake' as meaning that John sliced it. As Rumelhart points out, however, a different interpretation emerges if we imagine a context in which the policeman is the driver of the car : such a context provides for a totally different 'manner of stopping the car' on the policeman's part. Do we want to say that the transitive verb 'stop' in English covertly refers to a manner of stopping which the context is to specify ? Of course not. Transitive 'stop' means CAUSE TO STOP, and this can be fleshed out in all sorts of ways, yet the fleshing out process is different from the saturation process mandated by indexicals and other expressions whose standing meaning is gappy and requires contextual completion. Indeed we can construct a context in which (9) though it is, the linguistic meaning of these verbs is not gappy in the way in which the meaning of an indexical or under-specified expression is.
Of course, I may be wrong about 'stop' or 'cut'. But my point is more general. I think there may be semantic flexibility even if the expression whose occasion meaning is affected by the neighbouring words is not context-sensitive in the way in which indexicals and semantically under-specified expressions are. Consider another example I discuss in Literal
Meaning (Recanati 2004 : 34-36 ) :
(11) The city is asleep
Because of the apparent category violation (a city is not the sort of thing that sleeps) either 'asleep' must be interpreted in a metaphorical or extended sense as meaning QUIET AND SHOWING LITTLE ACTIVITY, or 'the city' has to be interpreted metonymically as referring to the inhabitants of the city. Either way, how we interpret one expression depends upon how we interpret the other. This is semantic flexibility once again, but of course we do not want to account for that type of example in terms of context-sensitivity and the character/content distinction. Rather, we take this case to involve a departure from literal meaning, resulting from some form of coercion. Let us assume that (11) is interpreted by giving to 'asleep' the extended sense QUIET AND SHOWING LITTLE ACTIVITY. That is not the literal sense of 'asleep'.
The literal sense of 'asleep' is ASLEEP, and there is nothing fancy about it (no hidden indexical, no free variable, etc.). In this particular case, the proper way of cashing out the distinction between standing meaning and occasion meaning is not by means of the distinction between the expression's character and its context-dependent content, but, rather, by means of the distinction between the expression's meaning in the language and the nonliteral sense it takes on through coercion in the context at hand.
In The suggestion, then, is that we should take the modulated meaning of an expression  in context c, viz. mod (, c) (I () c ), as the building block which our compositional machinery requires to deliver the correct interpretations for complex expressions. 5 Accordingly, we can keep the type of lexical rule we have worked with so far, viz :
(1*) I() c = f(c) (where 'f' is the character of expression ) but we must change the format of compositional rules so as to make room for modulation.
Instead of In this framework, do we really achieve compositionality ? Not in the strong sense in which compositionality is standardly understood. As we have seen, the content of a complex is a function of the modulated meanings of its parts (and the way they are put together), but it is not a function of the contents of its parts (and the way they are put together). Similarly, the modulated meaning of the complex is not a function of the modulated meanings of its parts (and the way they are put together) : for a given complex with a given content (determined by the modulated meanings of its parts and they way they are put together) can still be modulated in different ways.
Still, as Pagin (2005) and Westerståhl (this volume) point out, there is a sense in which a weak form of compositionality is achieved. Take the modulated meaning of the complex :
we can say that it is a function of the modulated meanings of the parts (and the way they are expression  and assume its modulated meaning depends (inter alia) upon the meaning of its complex host. The meaning of the host itself is liable to vary, because of modulation, depending on its host : and so on indefinitely (as Cohen argues in the passage quoted in §2).
So the meaning of  will never stabilize : there is unending equivocation, 'equivocation that can't be resolved', and it 'undermine[s] the compositionality of English' (Fodor 2003 : 99) .
Insofar as I understand the argument, it does not go through. Contextual modulation provides for potentially unending meaning variation, but never gives rise to any actual unending meaning variation. Meaning eventually stabilizes, making compositionality possible, because the (linguistic as well as extralinguistic) context, however big, is always finite.
The contextualist emphasizes the unending potential for variation in order to point out that the (modulated) meaning of an expression always depends upon the context and cannot be fixed simply by complexifying the expression and 'making everything explicit'. Thus the contextualist gives the following sort of example in support of the irreducibly contextual character of the interpretation process. 'John took out his key and opened the door' is interpreted in such a way that John is understood to have opened the door with the key ; this we get through modulation of 'open the door' which is understood via the contextual provision of a specific manner of opening. Can we make that explicit in the sentence, so as to get rid of the context-dependence ? Not quite : If we say 'he opened the door with the key' the new material gives rise to new underdeterminacies because it, too, can be variously modulated. The key may have been used as an axe to break the door open as well as inserted into the keyhole (Searle 1992 :182) . And if we make the way of using the key explicit, further indeterminacies will arise, and different meanings will emerge through modulation. However, when language is actually used and something is said, there is a definite context (both linguistic and extralinguistic) and it is finite. In virtue of the context, the various expressions ijn_00222049, version 2 -31 Oct 2009
